Swords Turned into Plowshares by Moyn, Samuel
EUROPEANS, it has been said, spent thefirst half of the 20th century slaugh-
tering one another and the second half
drowning their sorrows in production and
consumption. This is more or less con-
firmed by James J. Sheehan in his new
book. The eminent Stanford University
historian’s larger interest, though, is the
changed relationship between statehood
and warfare. It once would have been
unthinkable to define sovereignty apart
from military capacity and symbolism.
“Without war, there would be no state,”
declares the iron law of the 19th-century
historian Heinrich von Treitschke that is
the title of one of Sheehan’s chapters.
And by the end of the book he has effec-
tively established the astonishing trans-
formation reflected in his citation of the
words of Germany’s president in 1990:
“Today sovereignty means participating
in the international community.”
Sheehan says his objective is to show
that Europe’s refurbishment of sover-
eignty in a pacifist direction is thus far
exceptional. In 2002, the neoconserva-
tive author Robert Kagan similarly ar-
gued that Europeans now dream of a
utopia where violence and force have
passed from the world. Kagan offered his
view at a moment when Euro-American
relations were coming unglued over the
run-up to the Iraq invasion. Sheehan does
not openly reach Kagan’s conclusion that
the United States may have to take re-
sponsibility for patrolling a “dangerous
world” alone because its old allies have
grown soft. But he appears to want to
show Kagan was on to something signif-
icant that has become deeply ingrained.
The story told here has the Europeans
building a new kind of state after 1945, a
“civilian state,” under special conditions
created by the bipolar politics of the Cold
War. That conflict left certain parts of Eu-
rope armed to the teeth, but war was es-
sentially off the table. As pawns in a
geopolitical contest, Europeans faced
external constraints that for the first time
in history kept them from turning on each
other.
They responded to their new condi-
tion, Sheehan says, with an internal
choice: Through integration they would
make peace—by focusing on providing
goods and services. Since the Enlighten-
ment European thinkers had been pre-
dicting that violent passions would be
replaced by commercial interests,
and in the postwar world it
finally happened. Sheehan
does not deal seriously with
consumerism, but West
and East it undoubtedly
mattered that Europeans
became spenders and get-
ters, not simply workers
and makers.
Sheehan’s prose is el-
egant and economical; his
examples and quotations
are also beautifully mar-
shaled. “The killing
was relentless” in
World War I com-




of artillery rounds could go on for hours,
even days, as long as there were shells to
feed the guns.” The horror is neatly cap-
tured by his statistic that of France’s 1.3
million war dead, 300,000 were so man-
gled, dismembered or pulverized as to be
unidentifiable.
IN THE LIGHT of their history, it remainspuzzling that the Europeans could turn
all their swords into plowshares. It is one
thing to describe their transformation,
and quite another to explain it. Although
finely crafted as a descriptive narrative,
Where Have All the Soldiers Gone? is
somewhat less of an explanatory success.
One reason is Sheehan’s dispropor-
tionate attention to the Europeans’ pre-
World War II violence. This is essential
for registering how new their current
“pacifism” is. And it enables him to em-
phasize that civilians, rather than being
the foundation of European states, were
in the past sacrificed without a second
thought on war’s grim altar. But his analy-
sis of the era after World War II does not
begin until the book is three-quarters
over. So one has the feeling that a direct
answer to Sheehan’s main question is
constantly being postponed.
Then there is the matter of how broad
an explanation is necessary to make sense
of the momentous transition Sheehan has
in his sights. Early on, while covering the
attitudes toward war, he provides illumi-
nating vignettes of popular authors like
Norman Angell and Iwan Bloch.
Curiously, when he reaches
his key challenge in the
post-World War II period,
he lets geopolitics and
economics do almost all
the work. When the ex-
planatory premium is at
its height, he leaves out the
cultural and popular fac-
tors, but they may be criti-
cal to understanding what






ization of war that
persisted among
Europeans—as
Jean Lartéguy’s best-selling classic, The
Centurions (1961), graphically illus-
trates. On the other side of the ledger, the
hostility toward war and weapons pro-
liferation eventually expressed through
the German and other Green parties is not
mentioned. Usually originating from the
far Left (only alluded to as a source of
1970s terrorism), these attitudes are un-
likely to have been crystallized either by
early Cold War dualism or by commerce.
Sheehan does narrate the perpetration of
the Holocaust, but neglects to observe
that Europeans first came to grips with
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years after the fact, because new realities
initiated a greater sensitivity to violence.
One of these was the Europeans’ loss
of the foreign lands where they had long
employed brutality without compunc-
tion. Even as the foundations of the post-
war world were being laid, they did not
give up their old imperial posture. Shee-
han seems to minimize the profound
challenge colonial engagements (which
at one point he somewhat euphemisti-
cally labels “global obligations”) pose
to his main arguments. Nevertheless,
from this perspective much of post-
war European history looks more in
continuity with the bloody past than a
break from it.
In the 1950s and 1960s, facing better
armed opponents, the Europeans were
simply beaten; at other times, they decid-
ed the benefits of retaining overseas rule
did not justify the costs. Either way, their
“choice” to change did not flow directly
from postwar fundamentals. (And until
the end of the Cold War Europeans, East
and West, often supported the hot wars
of their patrons around the world.)
IT IS SHEEHAN’S chapter about what hashappened since 1989 that does perhaps
the most important work in Where Have
All the Soldiers Gone? By then war and
even genocide had returned to European
soil, and many saw a new consensus
growing for European militaries to play
a role in preventing atrocities like those
they had once perpetrated. Famously, the
German Foreign Minister Joschka Fis-
cher, previously a pacifist, came around
to supporting NATO’s armed intervention
in Kosovo. But, argues Sheehan, what
these episodes really show is that Euro-
peans had turned against war for good.
Britain and Russia—the one more eager
than Continental powers to sign onto
America’s campaigns and the other fight-
ing savage wars on the periphery—now
drop out of Sheehan’s account, though
they had been central to it before.
Sheehan is very good at recalling Eu-
ropean anxieties about deploying troops
in the 1990s and after. Yet it is danger-
ous to equate insistence on multilateral
agreement in initiating conflict—sover-
eignty as participation in the internation-
al community—with the rejection of
violence altogether. With his once paci-
fist party part of the governing Socialist
coalition, Fischer also supported the re-
cent Afghanistan campaign, meager as
Germany’s military help proved to be.
But together with other politicians of
“Old Europe,” he drew the line at Iraqi in-
vasion. Did this really express a distaste
for war now encoded in European genet-
ics? Or was it a rejection of the particular
war the United States had opted, against
all reason, to start?
One wonders, in other words, whether
Sheehan is really calling on a long-term
story to explain what in many ways is a
short-term phenomenon—European dis-
sent from America’s global war on terror.
It will take considerable time, after Iraq
and George W. Bush, to know if NATO’s
fracturing around Iraq portended some-
thing permanent. Despite the trans-
formation of their armies and attitudes,
Europeans retain the ability to deploy
massive force to strategic ends. 
So the question is whether telling a
history culminating in European dissent
from the Iraq adventure is a narrative too
neat and too final to capture how issue-
specific and hence temporary that dis-
sent may prove to be. Still, Sheehan is
clearly right in this thought-provoking
volume that something has happened,
however much one might question its
roots and depth. 
16 The New Leader
“MAGISTERIAL” may be an over-worked adjective in book re-
views, but it accurately describes Orlando
Figes’ latest volume. A professor of his-











Author, “Sparks of Liberty: An
Insider’s Memoir of Radio Liberty”
London, he has written two equally
weighty studies: Natasha’s Dance: A Cul-
tural History of Russia, and the multi-
prize-winner, A People’s Tragedy: The
Russian Revolution, 1891-1924. In The
Whisperers he reconstructs “private life
in Stalin’s Russia” through interviews
with representative samples of Russian
citizens at all levels of society who sur-
vived decades of oppression by the ruth-
less dictator and his successors. 
As a graduate researcher in Moscow
during the 1980s, Figes explains, he
made a first attempt at an oral history of
the early Soviet period by interviewing
Russian friends and their families, but
they seemed “too nervous to speak in
depth.” He realized then the importance
of producing a “counterweight to the of-
ficial narrative of Soviet history.” 
After the USSR collapsed in 1991,
Figes thought again about exploring “this
uncharted territory.” Not until 2002,
though, when he completed Natasha’s
Dance, did he undertake the task, assist-
ed by teams of researchers who gained
access to the public archives of Moscow,
St. Petersburg and other Russian cities,
and to over a dozen private family ar-
chives. Their most valuable source was
the testimony of more than 400 oral in-
terviews that usually lasted for hours and
often stretched to several days. Figes
himself conducted many of them. Some
were also provided by the Memorial So-
ciety, a Moscow-based human rights or-
ganization. There was a sense of urgency
about the undertaking because the aver-
age age of the interviewees was 80.
The author considers The Whisper-
ers unique in that it probes the interior
world of families and individuals during
seven decades of the Soviet system. Pre-
vious histories focused more on external
events in particular periods: the Civil
War of the 1920s; the persecution and
exile to Siberia of millions of “kulaks”
(moderately wealthier peasants) and
the “Great Terror” of the 1930s, which
included the execution of some of Stal-
in’s Party comrades; the crowded com-
munal housing of the urban proletariat;
the War and postwar years. Figes calls
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archi-
pelago (1973) the great oral history of
the labor camps. 
